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Abstract. The use of tracking settings in smartphones facilitates the
provision of tailored services to users by allowing service providers ac-
cess to unique identifiers stored on the smartphones. In this paper, we
investigate the ‘tracking off’ settings on the Blackberry 10 and Windows
Phone 8 platforms. To determine if they work as claimed, we set up a
test bed suitable for both operating systems to capture traffic between
the smartphone and external servers. We dynamically execute a set of
similar Blackberry 10 and Windows Phone 8 applications, downloaded
from their respective official markets. Our results indicate that even if
users turn off tracking settings in their smartphones, some applications
leak unique identifiers without their knowledge.
1 Introduction
Many service providers offer tailored services to their customers based on data
gathered from the users’ smartphones. Advertisements embedded within applica-
tions can be used to notify users of promotional offers in their nearby surround-
ings; however, several existing papers have shown that sensitive information such
as the device’s unique identifier and user’s physical location are often leaked via
advertising libraries without the device owner’s consent [1]. In general, smart-
phone users are given the option to control the following two tracking services:
location services and advertising. There are several papers in the literature ana-
lyzing these settings in Android and iOS based smartphones [2–6]. Some of this
work indicates that information can be leaked through advertising.
In this paper, we ask the question: If tracking settings are turned off on
BlackBerry 10 and Windows Phone 8 smartphones, is it possible that the de-
vices are still tracked? On both of these platforms, to our knowledge, the default
options that are provided by the smartphones have not been tested in any prior
work. We test them in this paper by addressing the following specific questions:
– Can we verify if applications leak the location information of the smartphone
when we turn off the location services and advertising tracking settings?
– Does any application access the smartphone’s unique identifiers when we
revoke the application’s permission to access information?
The contributions of this work can be summarized as follows:
1. We implement a real-time traffic monitoring platform and demonstrate how
to capture communication on Wi-Fi enabled smartphones.
2. We determine how well the tracking settings for location services and ad-
vertising work when they are turned off on a sample of BlackBerry 10 and
Windows Phone 8 applications.
3. In the event where the settings fail to operate properly, we provide rec-
ommendations on how users can ensure that attackers do not compromise
communications due to improper implementation4 of Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL) in applications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes existing
work and Section 3 provides background on tracking services. In Section 4 we
explain our experimental work, followed by an analysis of our empirical results
in Section 5. In Section 6, we discuss our findings followed by conclusions in
Section 7.
2 Related Work
2.1 BlackBerry
The BlackBerry 10 OS offers developers a list of permissions which can allow
users to control the resources accessible to the applications once installed on the
device. Unlike Android [5], many Blackberry permissions can be unchecked,
prompted or revoked from application permissions settings on the BlackBerry
10 devices. If an application tries to perform an action for which it does not
have the required permission, the user is given a prompt. This often leads users
to accept all permissions by default. BlackBerry reminds developers to have a
highly visible privacy policy of their own, and ensure that they comply with local
internet privacy legislation. This frees the Blackberry official applications site,
BlackBerry App World of any responsibility for privacy breaches by applications.
2.2 Windows Phone
The permission system on the Windows Phone platform bears many similarities
to that of the Android OS. However, Microsoft’s smartphone OS offers about 20
permissions for its application developers to which the users have to grant full
access upon installation of the application.
Even though many publications have been written about the Android and
iOS OS, to the best of our knowledge, there is little work in the literature
analysing any versions of the BlackBerry and Windows Phone OS.
4 http://heartbleed.com/
3 Tracking Services
We establish an experiment to determine if turning off tracking service settings
actually prevents tracking. If we capture leaked information when the setting is
‘off’, it is not working as it should. Since no data capture when the setting is ‘on’
does not necessarily indicate a malfunction, we do not test the ‘on’ settings. We
divide the tracking services into the following two categories: location services
and advertising.
3.1 Tracking Services on BlackBerry 10
Location services can be accessed under the Settings option of a BlackBerry
device. By default, the assumption is that whenever the setting for location
services is turned off, applications should not have access to the user’s location.
To verify if this stands true, we monitor access to the following three pieces
of information which are unique to the device and its user: (i) Media Access
Control (MAC), a 12-character unique device identifier, (ii) Internet Protocol
(IP) address and (iii) Global Positioning System (GPS) coordinates.
In order to test whether the tracking setting for advertising leak any infor-
mation when it is turned off, we monitor the use of two device identifiers that
are unique to a Blackberry smartphone: (i) International Mobile Equipment
Identity (IMEI), a 15-digit identifier and (ii) Hardware Personal Identification
Number (PIN), an 8 alphanumeric identifier. These distinct codes are highly
sought after by advertising companies for efficient user-profiling and to target
advertisements.
3.2 Tracking Services on Windows Phone 8
We follow a similar rationale as described in Section 3.1. To test whether the
Windows Phone 8 device leaks location-related information when the location
services setting is turned off, we observe the use of MAC address, IP address
and GPS coordinates by installed applications. On the Windows Phone platform,
users can switch off Location under the Settings option to deter access to location
information.
As for advertising, users do not have any option on the actual device to
regulate access to advertisements. Instead, they have to use their Microsoft ac-
count and visit the online ‘opt out page’5 to opt out of receiving personalized
advertisements and prevent applications from sending unique device identifiers
to 3rd parties. We survey the usage of the IMEI and Device Identifier (ID),
an alphanumeric string, by installed applications after a user has opted out of
communicating this information to external servers.
5 http://tinyurl.com/l2x8dyv
4 Experiment
4.1 Dataset Collection
The experiment was conducted using applications downloaded from the official
markets of BlackBerry 10 and Windows Phone 8 OS. To ensure that the ex-
periment was consistent, we only considered applications which were developed
by the same developer or the same company for both platforms. Since developer
profiles cannot be publicly accessed on the application markets, we manually
checked the developer’s information for each application for both of the OS be-
fore including it in our dataset. Due to this constraint, we conducted our study
with a small dataset of 40 BlackBerry and 40 Windows Phone applications.
4.2 Experimental Work
We set up a traffic monitoring test bed, as in [7], which is suitable for capturing
information from any device using Wi-Fi connectivity as shown in Fig. 1. We
used a BlackBerry Z10 smartphone running on the BlackBerry 10 OS and a
Nokia Lumia 520 smartphone running on the Windows Phone 8 OS to test our
dataset. The traffic sniffing tool, Mallory, was installed in a VM which was
running on Ubuntu version 12.04. The Mallory tool was developed by the firm
Intrepidus Group6 and is capable of capturing traffic packets to and from the
smartphones. We chose this tool as it facilitates the interception of SSL traffic
and acts as a MiTM proxy to capture packets in real-time communication.
We faced the issue of unstable network connections at the beginning of the
experiment, and, because traffic was being relayed through Mallory, we experi-
enced lengthy delays which often resulted in IP addresses being reset. To counter
this problem, we set up a dedicated mini Wi-Fi modem which allowed us to con-
nect all our devices on the same network. The VM hosting the Mallory tool
was allowed to connect to the Internet. In order to relay traffic between the
smartphones and Mallory, with the Blackberry phone, we were able to set up a
VPN, while at the time of the experiment, Microsoft had not yet implemented
the VPN option on their smartphone OS. To bypass this issue, we used a Wi-
Fi USB adapter which allowed us to carry out packet injections. This ensured
that Mallory could piggyback on the traffic being sent to and from the Windows
Phone 8.
As the smartphones and Mallory both share the same Internet connection,
any Internet-based traffic on the smartphones can be captured by Mallory (see
Fig. 1). The communication from smartphone to server is referred to as “c2s”
and server to smartphone as “s2c”; the Mallory tool captures both. This infor-
mation is then recorded in an SQL database which was later exported for further
analysis. Since the aim of this experiment is to monitor information leaked by the
smartphones when tracking services are turned off, we ignored the “s2c” com-
munications and instead focused on the “c2s” ones as they are more likely to
6 http://intrepidusgroup.com/insight/mallory/
Fig. 1: Overview of our Experimental Setup
reveal whether the applications on the smartphones are sending out information
without the user’s knowledge.
As explained in Section 3, we began by turning off all the tracking settings
on our experimental devices and then analyzed our dataset by installing one ap-
plication at a time. Each application was tested for two minutes. During the exe-
cution, we dynamically executed the application by checking all its features and
clicking on advertisements. Once the execution time was over, we stopped Mal-
lory from recording further traffic and uninstalled the application. We repeated
these steps for each of the 40 BlackBerry and 40 Windows Phone applications.
Once the experiment was concludeded, we exported all traffic logs outside the
VM and searched for the keywords listed in Section 3.
5 Analysis of Results
5.1 Presentation of Results
For each application in our dataset, we present our empirical results in two parts:
Location Services and Advertising. The results for BlackBerry and Windows
Phone are listed in Table 1 where the symbol ✕ means that one or more keyword
items were leaked; alternatively, Xis placed to demonstrate that the application
did not leak any information when tracking settings were turned off.
Recall that in our choice of application, we specifically chose ones for each
OS by the same developer and with the same name, therefore appearing to
have identical functionality. However, Table 1 indicates that this is not the case.
For instance, the 2nd and 23rd applications, namely Tube Map and Poynt
from Table 1 are considered to be consistent as the results on both OS are
identical. Conversely, the 1st and 3rd applications - BBC iPlayer and Bible
Table 1: BlackBerry and Windows Phone Applications with Tracking Setting Off
(X= Not leaked and ✕ = Leaked)
BlackBerry
Application Name
Windows Phone
Location Services Advertising Location Services Advertising
X X 1.BBC iPlayer ✕ X
X X 2.Tube Map X X
✕ X 3.Bible X ✕
X ✕ 4.Carrefour X X
X X 5.To Do List X X
X X 6.Combo Pic X ✕
✕ X 7.Copter X ✕
X X 8.Jetpack X X
X X 9.Wizards Choice X ✕
X X 10.Economic Times X X
✕ X 11.Falldown X ✕
X X 12.Real FootBall2013 X X
X X 13.Flashlight X X
X X 14.Hangman X ✕
X X 15.HDFC Bank X X
X X 16.Kompass X X
✕ X 17.Lega De Fulbol X X
X X 18.Logo Quiz X ✕
X X 19.Millionaire X ✕
X X 20.Nu NL X X
X X 21.OK Magazine X ✕
✕ X 22.PGA Tour ✕ X
✕ X 23.Poynt ✕ X
X X 24.QR Code X X
X X 25.Robotek ✕ X
X X 26.Skyscanner X X
X X 27.Texas Holdem P. X X
X X 28.Top Gear X X
X ✕ 29.Tuding X X
X X 30.Tune in Radio X X
✕ X 31.Wikipedia X X
✕ X 32.WWE X X
✕ X 33.XE Currency X X
X X 34.Avianca X X
X X 35.Chelsea FC NEWS X ✕
X X 36.Daily Express UK X X
X X 37.USA Today X X
X X 38.Money Control X X
X X 39.Toshl Finance X X
X X 40.Park Mobile X X
respectively, are inconsistent as despite being the same applications executed on
two different platforms, the results are different. In fact, there are 18 applications
in our dataset that produced inconsistent results7.
We believe there might be several reasons behind this discrepancy. During
the experiment, each application was executed for a period of two minutes.
Although this time constraint was applied to both BlackBerry and Windows
Phone platforms, there is no guarantee that the execution patterns on each OS
were identical. Moreover, despite the fact that all the applications in our dataset
are available on both the BlackBerry and Windows Phone official application
markets and share application developers, we did not verify if the applications
7 Application numbers 1,3,4,6,7,9,11,14,17-19,21,25,29,31-33,35 from Table 1
also make use of the same third party libraries. Different advertising libraries
can appear in several posted versions of the same initial application because the
business model of smartphones encourages developers to embed multiple third
party libraries in order to increase revenue from advertising.
5.2 Information Leaks when Tracking Setting is Off
Out of 40 applications executed on the BlackBerry platform, 10% (4) leaked
either the GPS coordinates or IP address despite the setting for location services
being off. These 4 applications are also part of the subset of 18 applications which
produced inconsistent results, as described in Section 5.1. However, the results
for advertising are far better as only 2 applications, Carrefour and Tuding
leaked information about the Hardware PIN to advertisers when the tracking
setting was turned off. It is also worth mentioning that none of the Blackberry
applications leaked the IMEI or MAC address.
As for the Windows Phone platform, 35% (14) leaked information related to
either location services or advertising. Whilst none of the 40 Windows Phone
applications sent out GPS coordinates, the following four applications leaked
either the MAC address or IP address: BBC iPlayer, Robotek, PGA Tour
and Poynt. Unlike on the BlackBerry platform, the last 2 applications do not
appear in the subset of 18 applications mentioned in Section 5.1. In terms of
advertising related information leaked when the tracking setting was off, 10%
of the Windows Phone applications sent out the Device ID information and the
IMEI identifier was not divulged at all.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we empirically analyzed 40 Blackberry and 40 Windows Phone ap-
plications. We tested whether tracking service settings for location services and
advertising leak information when their tracking is turned off. We found that
some applications still leak the user’s location and device related information to
third parties. Additionally, we observed that if an application does not leak any
information on one particular smartphone OS, for instance BlackBerry, there is
no guarantee that the same application will behave in a similar way on a differ-
ent platform, (here for example, Windows Phone). Finally, we recommend some
actions to overcome the issues we highlighted based on our empirical results.
6.1 Recommendations
Application developers earn revenue from in-application advertisements which is
why many offer their applications free of charge. Advertising is very important
for the smartphone application ecosystem as it is a major factor in the business
model of the smartphone platform. Generally, the applications are required to
send the smartphone’s unique identifiers to advertizing agencies and in return,
the application developers earn a revenue for using that agency’s advertizing
library. Hence, there is a trade-off between convenience and user privacy. There-
fore, we recommend the following:
1. Smartphone users should have easy access to adequate functionalities on
their devices that will help protect their private information. As such, we
recommend that Microsoft implements a setting on their smartphones to
allow users to easily opt out of advertising, instead of doing so via the web.
2. Application developers should be obliged to list the names and owners of
third party advertising libraries that are used in their applications. Users
should be made aware upfront of the advertising companies that have access
to their information.
3. Smartphone OS providers should ensure that when location services is turned
off, no location-related information is revealed to third parties. This could
either take the form of an additional check that is conducted when a new
application is uploaded on the application market or after the fact, fines
could be issued to deter application developers from unethically accessing
such information.
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